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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
These long overdue recognitions of standing afford the public
greater participation in the governmental process. Although article
7-A of the State Finance Law provides for guidelines absent in
Boryszewski, further legislative and judicial clarification and explana-
tion of both the article and the case law is needed.279 This articula-
tion must not be delayed, for uncertainty as to threshold require-
ments such as standing overly encumber the decision to initiate an
otherwise meritorious action. The practitioner should be aware of
the inconsistencies between article 7-A and Boryszewski as well as the
issues posed by a close examination of article 7-A itself and frame
his standing argument accordingly.
Legislature's attempt to meet medical malpractice crisis.
The rising cost of medical malpractice insurance 28 0 has caused
consternation within the medical profession. Pressured by the
doubling of premium costs and the possibility that many insurance
companies might curtail or abolish protection, doctors across the
country have protested by staging or threatening. strikes.281 In New
York, the threat of a walkout by the medical profession induced
the legislature282 to extensively revise the law of medical malprac-
tice .2 83 The major changes became effective July 1, 1975 and apply
to acts of malpractice occurring on or after that date.284
One of the enactments provided for the creation of a medical
malpractice insurance association. 28 5 Composed of "all insurers au-
279 Clarification should be based on an evaluation of the various public policy consid-
erations underlying the different treatment accorded actions under the State Finance Law,
the General Municipal Law, and Boryszew'ski. It is submitted that a consistent overall ap-
proach to citizen-taxpayer actions would be preferable.
280 Insurance costs have risen astronomically. As of 1975, the rates averaged 16 times
those charged in 1966, with further increases predicted in the near future. N.Y. Times, June
1, 1975, § 1 (News), at 47, col. 5.
It is interesting to note that as of 1975 more than 7000 of the 12,000 physicians
practicing in New York City and Nassau County were paying premiums of $2067 or less. Id.,
June 1, 1975, § 1 (News), at 46, col, 3. When compared to other insurance expenses, such as
automobile coverage, this amount does not seem excessive. While it is true that some
physicians in high-risk specialties pay top premiums of up to $14,329, id., these physicians
usually charge higher fees for their services.
21 E.g., id., May 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id. May 21, 1975, at 30, col. 6 (doctors' strike on
West Coast).2 2 MId., May 16, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
283 Ch. 109, §9 1-37, [1975] N.Y. Laws 134 (McKinney) (codified in scattered sections of
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw; CPLR; N.Y. EDUC. LAW; N.Y. INS. LAw; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw; N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAw; N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAw). While there is no general definition of
medical malpractice applicable to the whole package of malpractice legislation, the term is
defined in the enactment's amendment to the Insurance Law to include liability for death or
injury caused by a "licensed physician or hospital." N.Y. INS. LAw § 681(2) (McKinney Supp.
1975). Perhaps that definition will be held to apply to other statutes in the new legislation as
well. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3403, commentary at 13 (Supp. 1975).
284 Ch. 109, § 37, [1975] N.Y. Laws 157 (McKinney).
2-'5 N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 681-95 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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thorized to write . . . personal injury liability insurance, ' 28 6 the
association has the power to issue insurance policies subject to the
approval of the Superintendent of Insurance.287 The purpose of
the association is to alleviate some of the difficulties doctors face in
trying to obtain medical malpractice insurance. 2 8 It fulfills this
purpose at least to the extent of assuring doctors basic protection;
it is anticipated, however, that the burden of the high cost of the
policies, so irksome to the profession, will not be alleviated. 8 9
Thus, the creation of the association may well prove to be a surface
cosmetic with little permanent value. Many doctors, dissatisfied
with the enactment, reacted by forming their own insurance car-
rier.290
Even if the insurance association does not provide significant
monetary relief from the high cost of coverage, sweeping changes
216 Id. § 682(1). Specifically excluded from this definition are assessment cooperative fire
insurance companies. Id.
287 Policy coverage for physicians is limited to $1 million for each injured party and $3
million for all claimants under any one policy in a year. Id. § 682(5)(a)(1). Hospitals may
obtain excess coverage provided "the coverage in excess of such limits shall be fully rein-
sured for the term of the policy." Id. § 682(5)(a)(2). Policy forms must be filed with and
approved by the Superintendent of Insurance. Id. § 684(1).
The rates for each doctor are to be calculated "on an actuarially sound basis,... to be
self-supporting .... based upon reasonable standards, and may give consideration to such
factors as the experience of the insured, geographical area and specialities of practice." Id.
§ 684(2). Another factor which will undoubtedly figure in any calculation of rates is the
proficiency of the doctor as measured in terms of claims made against him.
If the contract contains a deductible clause, the doctor is permitted to purchase an
option whereby the association is not allowed to settle any claim under the policy without his
consent. Id. § 684(4). This is an attempt by the legislature to make the choice of a deductible
clause more attractive to doctors. Probably because the physician's professional reputation is
at stake, it has been common practice not to settle malpractice claims without consent. See,
e.g., MEDICAL LIABILITY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY POLICY (home office: Lake Success, New York). Most liability insurance
policies, however, leave the question of settlements to the sole discretion of the insurer. See
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1138 (1954).
Difficulties arise where the suit is brought for more than the insured's coverage. In such a
situation, if the insurance company refuses an equitable settlement, the insured may be liable
for the excess. The insurer may also settle weak claims in order to avoid going to trial. The
option will give the insured a decisive vote in settlement decisions.
To provide the association with a cash reserve, each insured must pay into an "annual
stabilization reserve fund" an amount "equal to twenty percent of the annual premium
charge." N.Y. INS. LAW § 688 (McKinney Supp. 1975). Once the reserve reaches $50 million,
the annual surcharge ceases; upon dissolution of the association, any excess funds will be
distributed to the participants. Id.
281 See Governor's Memorandum, May 21, 1975, as appearing in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1739
(McKinney), on approving ch. 109, §§ 1-37, [1975] N.Y. Laws 134 (McKinney).
289 Senator John R. Dunne (R. Garden City) indicated that even with this new legisla-
tion, doctors could still expect a premium increase of between 75% and 80%. N.Y. Times,
May 16, 1975, at 11, col. I.
29' Id., May 29, 1975, at 22, col. 4. A recent revision in the new malpractice legislation
permitting self-insurance provides doctors with another way to take matters into their own
hands and possibly save money. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 101 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
Doctors can now consider self-insuring themselves to a certain minimum level and purchas-
ing insurance protection for claims exceeding that amount.
1976] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
in tort law governing medical malpractice portend a decrease in
costs by reducing the number of claims filed. Major changes in this
area were effected with respect to the statute of limitations by the
legislature's addition of section 214-a to the CPLR. Under the CPA
malpractice was governed by a 2-year limitation period.291 With the
adoption of the CPLR, the statute of limitations for malpractice was
increased to 3 years, the same as that for other negligence ac-
tions.292 Now, in an attempt to reduce the number of claims which
can be brought, the limitation period has been shortened to 2/2
years from the time the cause of action accrued. 293 While a statute
of limitations has the beneficial purpose of preventing stale
claims,294 this enactment, passed solely to cut off otherwise viable
causes of action, seems rather one-sided. It must be pointed out,
however, that the new statute of limitations is still not as favorable
to physicians as was the CPA.
A concomitant consideration also dealt with in CPLR 214-a is
the time of accrual. The general rule has been that the cause of
action accrues at the time the act of malpractice is committed.295
Unfortunately, the patient is often unaware of the injury for some
time after the act of malpractice. To soften the often harsh effects
of this rule, the judiciary developed an exception for continuous
treatment. 296 When medical care extends over a period of time, the
291 CPA 50(1).
292 Ch. 308, § 214(6), [1962] N.Y. Laws 1310.
293 CPLR 214-a.
294 One student author has noted:
The primary consideration underlying such legislation is undoubtedly one of fair-
ness to the defendant. There comes a time when he ought to be secure in his
reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations,
and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim when "evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
Note, Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950)
(footnote omitted), quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S.
342, 349 (1944). A similar point of view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the early
case of Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868).
295 Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (Ist Dep't), affd mem., 254
N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930); Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and
Other Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339, 340 (1962).
206 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319
(1962). The continuous treatment rule was first applied in New York in Sly v. Van Lengen,
120 Misc. 420, 422, 198 N.Y.S. 608, 610 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1923) ("plaintiff's cause
of action accrued as much by reason of the alleged continuous breach of duty on the part of
the defendant . . . as it did because of the alleged negligent act .... ").
The continuous treatment doctrine originated in a decision of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). The Gillette court set forth
considerations for the theory that are still applicable today:
Indeed, it would be inconsistent to say that the plaintiff might sue for her injuries
while the surgeon was still in charge of the case, and advising and assuring her that
proper patience would witness a complete recovery. It would be trifling with the law
and the courts to exact compliance with such a rule, in order to have a standing in
court for the vindication of her rights. It would impose upon her an improper
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cause of action is deemed not to accrue until the date of the last
treatment.197 As enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Borgia v.
City of New York, 298 the continuous treatment doctrine applies in the
case of "treatment for the same or related illnesses or injuries,
continuing after the alleged acts of malpractice, not mere con-
tinuity of a general physician-patient relationship."'2 99 There is
some question as to whether this doctrine has been limited by the
new legislation 0 0 since CPLR 214-a restricts continuous treatment
to "the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said
act [of malpractice]." In addition, the new statute excludes from
continuous treatment "examinations undertaken at the request of
the patient for the sole purpose of ascertaining the state of the
patient's condition." Apparently, this was intended to forestall at-
tempts to unilaterally extend the statute of limitations where con-
tinued treatment was not in fact needed. It should not preclude the
extension of the limitation period by any subsequent visits for the
treatment of complications arising from the malpractice.
Section 214-a of the CPLR also codifies the foreign object
discovery rule propounded by the Court of Appeals in Flanagan v.
Mount Eden General Hospital.301 Prior to this decision, application of
the general rule30 2 in cases where a foreign object had been negli-
gently left in the patient's body often resulted in a running of the
statute of limitations before the patient could have known he had a
cause of action. Realizing the inequity of such a result, the Flanagan
Court ruled that "where a foreign object has negligently been left
in the patient's body, the Statute of Limitations will not begin to
run until the patient could have reasonably discovered the mal-
practice. ' 30 3 The Flanagan rule was subsequently interpreted as
burden to hold that, in order to prevent the statute from running against her right
of action, she must sue while she was following the advice of the surgeon, and upon
which she all the time relied.
Id. at 119, 65 N.E. at 871.
207 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d
319, 321 (1962); Richmond v. Capers, 30 App. Div. 2d 976, 294 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't
1968) (mem.).
298 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.YS.2d 319 (1962).
209 Id. at 157, 187 N.E.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 322 (emphasis added). No further acts
of malpractice need occur during the course of the continued treatment. See O'Laughlin v.
Salamanca Hosp. Dist. Auth., 36 App. Div. 2d 51, 319 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dep't 1971),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 147, 150 (1971).3
'But see Kramer, Medical Malpractice, 174 N.Y.L.J. 51, Sept. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 1,
wherein the author contends that the new law "restates" the Borgia rule. Id. at 5, col. 1.
301 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969) (surgical clamps left in
plaintiff's body not discovered until 8 years later when patient experienced severe abdominal
pain).
302 See note 295 and accompanying text supra.
303 24 N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27. The Court remarked that
any other result would be "'an undue strain upon common sense, reality, logic and simple
[Vol. 50:575
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affording a plaintiff the right to bring his action within either 3
years from the commission of the act of malpractice or 2 years
from the date of actual or imputed discovery.30 4 The new legisla-
tion changes the latter time period to 1 year from either the
date of discovery or "the date of discovery of facts which would
reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier."
30 5
In several respects, the new legislation reverses the progressive
trend taken by New York lower courts since Flanagan. In Dobbins v.
Clifford,3 0 6 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, expanded
the Flanagan rule to a case which did not involve a foreign object.
The plaintiff in Dobbins had sustained damage to his pancreas
during an operation. The damage was not discovered until 4 years
later. The court, applying the Flanagan approach, found that
an act of malpractice [had been] committed internally so that
discovery [was] difficult; real evidence of the malpractice in the
form of the hospital record is available ... ; professional diagnos-
tic judgment is not involved, and there is no danger of false
claims.3 07
The legislature made no reference to the Dobbins situation although
CPLR 214-a specifically codifies both the Borgia continuous treat-
ment and the Flanagan foreign object exceptions. This would ap-
pear to militate against judicial application of the Dobbins exception
in the future.
justice .... ' Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26, quoting Morgan v. Grace
Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 792, 144 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1965).
3'4 Subsequent to the Flanagan decision it was suggested that the foreign object discov-
ery rule should be subject to CPLR 203(f). 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 214, commentary at 435.
CPLR 203(f) provides in pertinent part that
where the time within which an action must be commenced is computed from the
time when facts were distovered or from the time when facts could with reasonable
diligence have been discovered .... the action must be commenced within two years
after such actual or imputed discovery or within the period otherwise provided,
computed from the time the cause of action accrued, whichever is longer.
Indeed, in Slagen v. Marwill, 78 Misc. 2d 275, 356 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County
1974), the court held that a foreign object medical malpractice action must be commenced
within the limitation set forth in CPLR 203(f). Since the plaintiff in Slagen had commenced
the action more than 3 years after the alleged malpractice and more than 2 years after its
discovery, the court dismissed the complaint as untimely.
303 CPLR 2 14-a. There is some disagreement as to whether the discovery rule preempts
the basic limitation period of 21 years. While it seems reasonable to give the plaintiff at least
the statutory period to bring his action, with the discovery rule serving only to extend the
statutory period if needed, Dean Joseph M. McLaughlin contends that
a plaintiff can never get the benefit of the two-and-one-half year statute of lim-
itations in a foreign objects case. In other words, if the patient discovers a foreign
object in his body within three months after the surgeon negligently leaves it there,
the patient appears to be bound by the one-year statute of limitations.
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 214-a, commentary at 49 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis in original).
306 39 App. Div. 2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743 (4th Dep't 1972), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 148, 153 (1972).
207 39 App. Div. 2d at 4, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
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The new malpractice legislation specifically prohibits the ex-
tension given the Flanagan rule by the Appellate Division, Second
Department, in Murphy v. St. Charles Hospital.30 8 The Murphy court
applied the foreign object discovery rule to a malpractice action
involving a patient injured when a prosthetic device broke.30 9 By
excluding prosthetic devices from the meaning of the term
"foreign object," GPLR 214-a precludes reliance on the foreign
object discovery rule in this situation. 3 10 This appears particularly
unfair to the patient, since he may be effectively precluded from
bringing a cause of action for malpractice.3 11
CPLR 208, which tolls the statute of limitations for plaintiffs
under the disability of infancy or insanity, has also been amended.
In general, CPLR 208 provides that if the time limit for commenc-
ing the action is 3 years or more, the plaintiff has up to 3 years
from the date the disability ceases to institute the action.312 Mal-
308 35 App. Div. 2d 64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 500, 507 (1971).
309 35 App. Div. 2d at 67, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 980. The court noted an additional reason for
allowing the action:
[T]he plaintiffs' cause of action could not have accrued before the prosthesis broke
because a necessary element of the cause of action - injury - had not yet oc-
curred .... [Ilt is only where the negligent act creates damage or injury that a cause
of action comes into being.
Id.
3 1
°See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 214-a, commentary at 49 (Supp. 1975). CPLR 214-a
specifically states: "For the purpose of this section the term 'foreign object' shall not include
a chemical compound, fixation device or prosthetic aid or device."
311 If the problem is caused by a defective device, as opposed to faulty installation, the
plaintiff would probably have available a cause of action in breach of warranty or strict
products liability. As to negligently installed devices, however, the plaintiff may be barred by
the running of the statute of limitations before he even becomes aware of his cause of action.
Before the running of the statute the plaintiff may have only slight difficulties which are not
yet significant enough to cause him to seek medical attention and/or which he does not
realize are related to the negligent installation. Moreover, the patient may also be unable to
rely on the continuous treatment doctrine. Treatments sought by the patient after the
installation of the device could be considered examinations "undertaken at the request of the
patient for the sole purpose of ascertaining the state of the patient's condition." CPLR 214-a.
The patient can only hope that the courts strictly construe "sole purpose" so as to permit the
application of the continuous treatment doctrine where the requested examination could
relate to prior improper treatment. Dean McLaughlin's comments are appropriate in this
regard:
Granted that the purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect the defendant from
stale claims, one may question whether this should ever be achieved at the expense
of a plaintiff who did not and could not have known of the defendant's malpractice.
... It is grim logic indeed which concludes that a patient may commence an action
even before he knows that he has an action to commence.
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 214, commentary at 434 (1972).
3' CPLR 208 provides in pertinent part:
If... the time otherwise limited for commencing the action is three years or more
and expires no later than three years after the disability ceases, or the person under
the disability dies, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be
extended to three years after the disability ceases or the person under the disability
dies, whichever event first occurs . ...
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practice actions were formerly included in this category.313 Where
the time within which the action must be commenced is less than 3
years, the limitation period is only extended by the duration of the
disability. 3' 4 As a result of the reduction in the statute of limitations
from 3 to 2/2 years, malpractice now falls within the latter provi-
sion.31 . If the disability is insanity, it has long been the rule that the
statute is not to be tolled for more than 10 years after the cause of
action accrues. 316 As a result of the 1975 amendment to CPLR 208,
that limitation now also applies to infants injured because of medi-
cal malpractice. 317
There are two possible approaches to the subject of statutes of
limitation. The first can be traced back to the civil law doctrine that
"limitations statutes should be viewed as extinguishing the claim
and destroying the right itself. ' 318 The more prevalent view in this
country, however, is that statutes of limitations do nothing more
than "cut off resort to the courts for enforcement of a claim. '319 As
a result, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that these
statutes are within the legislative sphere and do not infringe upon a
natural or fundamental right.320 The practical effect, however, of
limiting the statute of limitations to 10 years in cases of infants'
medical malpractice claims is to deny those infants the right to have
their claims resolved if neither the infants' parents or guardian
institute an action on their behalf. Conceivably, there will be chil-
dren injured through the negligence of a doctor shortly after birth,
who will therefore be only 10 years old at the time the statute of
limitations has run.321 A child may not bring an action until he is
18;322 yet, he is now required to institute a malpractice action
before he is 10. While it is true that parents and guardians will be
able to bring the action within the statutory period,323 the child
should not be precluded from recovery by the inaction of others.
This is the very rationale behind tolling the limitation periods when
infants are involved. 324
313 See note 292 and accompanying text supra.
314 CPLR 208.
3" See note 293 and accompanying text supra.
31J CPLR 208.
3 17 Id.
'" Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1945).
3 19 Id. (footnote omitted).
3 2 1Id. at 314.
321 Kramer, Medical Malpractice, 174 N.Y.L.J. 51, Sept. 11, 1975, at 5, col. 1.
32 2 See CPLR 1050), 1201.3 23 Id. 1201.
324 See SECOND REP. 58.
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Another area in the law of medical malpractice which waz
substantially revised by the new legislation is the doctrine of in-
formed consent. 325 A physician may be held liable under this doc-
trine for his failure to adequately inform the patient of risks inci-
dent to the particular treatment, even though the treatment itself
was proper. 326 The question thus arises whether the scope of dis-
closure of known dangers was reasonable. The traditional ap-
proach has been that the applicable standard of care is that of the
medical community, which the plaintiff must prove by use of ex-
pert testimony.32 7 More recently, courts have dispensed with the
need of expert testimony by adopting the negligence standard of
reasonable care,3 28 thus alleviating the plaintiff's burden. The new
The doctrine of informed consent has as its basis the tort principle that "[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body .... Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914). See Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgr,, 14 RoCKY MT.
L. REV. 233, 236 (1942). As a result, the failure of the physician to obtain permission for the
treatment is the tort of battery. Note, Consent as a Prerequisite to a Surgical Operation, 14 U.
CIN. L. REV. 161, 162 (1940). The distinction between the tort action where the patient did
not consent and the negligence action where there was a lack of informed consent because
the patient was not adequately apprised of the risks involved is discussed in 7B McKINNEY's
CPLR 214, commentary at 39 (Supp. 1975). In one area, however, the physician is protected
from a failure to obtain consent, i.e., where the doctor aids the public in an emergency
situation. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6527(2) (McKinney 1972). The aid must be without an expecta-
tion of monetary compensation and must be rendered at the scene of the accident. The
physician in such a situation is only liable for his gross negligence. Id.
326 See, e.g., Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't
1973); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 26 App. Div. 2d 693, 694, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (2d Dep't
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
The plaintiff must show that he received his injury while undergoing treatment that he
ordinarily would not have consented to were all the material risks known. See Waltz &
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 646-48 (1969). Where the
plaintiff is unable to consent, i.e., in a coma, and it is necessary to operate before consent can
be obtained, there is no requirement to disclose. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 130, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
327 Petterson v. Lynch, 59 Misc. 2d 469, 299 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1969).
328 See Garone v. Roberts' Technical & Trade School, Inc.. 47 App. Div. 2d 306, 366
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't 1975); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d
552 (4th Dep't 1973). These New York cases follow the main federal case in point, Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). A similar result
has been reached in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
In Fogal, the court, praising the Canterbury decision, stated:
In Canterbury, the court held that the duty and scope of disclosure arise apart from
medical considerations and are not governed by the profession's standards of due
care but by the general standard of conduct reasonable under all the circumstances.
This general standard recognizes the patient's prerogative to decide on the pro-
jected treatment whereas a medical standard is largely selfserving.
41 App. Div. 2d at 473, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
Application of the reasonableness standard has been condemned in Markham, The
Doctrine of Informed Consent-Fact or Fiction?, 10 FORUM 1073 (1975), wherein the author,
decrying the abolition of expert testimony, stated: "Such a theory totally destroys the
traditional concepts that a physician is not the guarantor of a cure, and that he is liable only
when he fails to conform to the standards of good practice applicable to the procedure." Id.
at 1076 (emphasis omitted). The author, however, fails to consider why such a rule was
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malpractice legislation apparently returns to the old standard re-
quiring an expert. The Public Health Law was amended to add
section 2805-d, which defines lack of informed consent as "the
failure . . . to disclose to the patient such alternatives [to the
treatment] .. .and the reasonably foreseeable risks . . . involved as
a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have
disclosed .. ,,329 In addition, section 4401-a was added to the CPLR
to provide that if the plaintiff brings an action based solely on lack
of informed consent, a defendant's motion for judgment at the
termination of the plaintiff's case is to be granted "if the plaintiff
has failed to adduce expert medical testimony" to show the qualita-
tive insufficiency of the consent.330 Such a rule will create much
hardship, since it is often difficult to procure an expert witness.33 1
The law of medical malpractice was also changed by the legis-
lature's addition of section 4010 to the CPLR. This new provision
permits the jury, or the court where it is the trier of fact, to
consider collateral sources of payment when the plaintiff in an
action for medical malpractice seeks recovery for rehabilitation,
medical care, custodial care, or economic loss, such as loss of
earnings.332 As a result, the physician's insurance carrier stands to
be the recipient of a windfall because of the patient's prudence in
obtaining excellent insurance coverage. This is highly unsatisfac-
formulated, viz to counteract the well-known reluctance of doctors to testify in malpractice
actions.
329 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(I) (McKinney Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). The
theory of lack of informed consent is limited to nonemergency treatment or a diagnostic
procedure involving an invasion of the body. Id. § 2805-d(2).
Four defenses to a malpractice action based on a lack of informed consent are included
in the statute. Thd doctor may be able to show that "the risk not disclosed is too commonly
known to warrant disclosure." Id. § 2805-d(4)(a). This means that it was commonly known to
patients in general, not to doctors. Another defense is that "the patient assured the medical
practitioner he would undergo the treatment ...regardless of the risk involved, or...
assured the medical practitioner that he did not want to be informed . I..." d. § 2805-
d(4)(b). The last two defenses are that it was not reasonably possible to obtain consent under
the circumstances or that the patient was not physically or emotionally able to handle
knowledge of the true risks involved. Id. §§ 2805-d(4)(c), (d).330 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 4401-a, commentary at 90 (Supp. 1975), which states:
If the medical activity was needful under the circumstances, the hope of this
provision is that no reputable doctor will support the plaintiffs contention that he
did not consent and that a disreputable doctor so testifying can be undone on
cross-examination.
Whether this language permits the use of the defendant doctor as a medical expert for the
plaintiff is uncertain. This was previously allowed in a malpractice action. McDermott v.
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1964).
' See Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396, 1405-
06 (1967); 75 HARV. L. REv. 1445, 1447 (1962).
332 Included under this section are any funds such as "insurance, social security ....
workmen's compensation or employee benefit programs ...." CPLR 4010. Excluded are
collateral sources that would be entitled to reimbursement from the plaintiff's recovery. Id.
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tory, since in effect the patient will be making payments on an
insurance policy which will benefit the physician's carrier and ulti-
mately the physician.3 33 Since the trier of fact may give such weight
to the evidence of collateral benefits as it chooses, 334 the jury or the
court may temper this unjust result.335
The new legislation has also effected several changes in the
Judiciary Law which, it is hoped, will help to clear the dockets of
the current backlog of malpractice actions. To this end, the ad-
ministrative board of the Judicial Conference has been given the
power to promulgate rules and procedures to dispose of medical
malpractice actions promptly. 336 Changes have also been made in
333 Perhaps the recipient of such a windfall ought to reimburse the plaintiff for the
premiums paid. In any event, "[ilt would seem equitable, if the defendant can adduce
evidence that the plaintiff has some protection from other founts, to permit the plaintiff to
show that he paid to have those founts installed." 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 4010, commentary
at 40 (Supp. 1975).
331 CPLR 4010 specifically provides that "[s]uch evidence shall be accorded such weight
as the trier of the facts chooses to ascribe to it."
= See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 4010, commentary at 40 (Supp. 1975). The traditional
view towards collateral benefits was clearly enuniciated in Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61
(10th Cir. 1958), where the court stated:
No reason in law, equity or good conscience can be advanced why a wrongdoer
should benefit from part payment from a collateral source of damages caused by his
wrongful act. If there must be a windfall certainly it is more just that the injured
person shall profit therefrom, rather than the wrongdoer shall be relieved of his
full responsibility for his wrongdoing.
Id. at 65. The court took judicial notice that personal injury cases cannot be fully compen-
sated because of the "incidental losses and handicaps." Id.
Yet, others have taken the position that:
The sole purpose of a personal injury action is to compensate for actual loss. With
this purpose in mind, it is difficult to comprehend how a person can be allowed to
recover for a loss he never actually sustained in the name of benevolence to the
most deserving.
Ghiardi, The Collateral Source Ru'le: Multiple Recovery in Personal Injury Actions, 1967 INS. L.J.
457, 460. In Hirsch, Malpractice Crisis: Fact orFiction, 80 CASE & CoN!. July/Aug. 1975, at 3, 4,
the author suggests the use of collateral sources of benefits as a means of relieving the
economic burden of damage awards.
336 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAWv § 213(9) (McKinney Supp. 1975). The board's rules shall
prescribe time limitations and procedures for the "calendaring of causes upon joinder of
issue, the assignment of cases to medical malpractice panels, . . . to a trial judge or to a trial
part, and the conduct of pre-trial procedures." Id.
Another change intended to facilitate settlement of medical malpractice claims relates to
CPLR 3 403(a). This section, which lists those actions entitled to trial preferences, has been
expanded to include medical malpractice actions. CPLR 3403(a)(5). According to Professor
David D. Siegel, the definition of medical malpractice within the new malpractice legislation,
see note 283 supra, suggests that the preference would not include "such claims (analogous to
medical malpractice if not precisely that) as those against nurses, medics, chiropractors,
pharmacists, and the like." 7B McKNNEY'S CPLR 3403, commentary at 13 (Supp. 1975).
The American Arbitration Association has offered its own solution for the speedy
disposition of claims. It has established a voluntary program across New York State for the
arbitration of medical malpractice actions. Under this program, the patient is asked to sign
an agreement at the start of the treatment to submit any claim that may arise therefrom to
arbitration. 174 N.Y.L.J. 55, Sept. 17, 1975, at 1, cols. 3-4. While such a program may
facilitate claims resolution, it may be at the patient's expense. Firstly, there is no judicial
review on the merits of an arbitrator's award. See Raisler Corp. v. New York City Housing
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the procedures for cases assigned to a medical malpractice panel
pursuant to section 148-a of the Judiciary Law.337 The parties may
now object in writing to any doctor or attorney designated for the
hearing.338 If the parties are unable to agree to a settlement and an
action is subsequently brought, a written recommendation of the
panel's finding of liability will be admissible at the request of any
party, provided the panel's decision was unanimous. 3 39 The
findings are not binding on the trier of fact however, and the jury
or trial court may accord the recommendation any weight it may
wish. 340 Nonetheless, it is anticipated that pretrial awareness of this
right should be very effective in encouraging settlements.
Accompanying these important changes in the substantive and
procedural aspects of medical malpractice law is the institution of a
state board to govern the conduct of the medical profession.3 4' Its
physician members are to be appointed on recommendation by the
various medical societies in the State. 342 Lay members are ap-
pointed by the Commissioner of Health, subject to the approval of
the Governor. 43 The Board of Regents will have the power to
Auth., 32 N.Y.2d 274, 282, 298 N.E.2d 91, 94-95, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917, 923 (1973); In re
Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 496-97, 62 N.E. 575, 576 (1902). Moreover, it is possible for the
arbitration agreement between doctor and patient to set a ceiling on the amount recoverable
which can be unrelated to the injuries sustained. Cf Coughlin v. MVAIC, 45 Misc. 2d 672,
674, 257 N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
117 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1975) provides for the establishment
by each department of the Appellate Division of medical malpractice panels. Each panel is to
be composed of a Supreme Court Justice, a doctor, and an attorney. The doctor and
attorney are chosen from those regularly practicing in the State. Only trial attorneys may be
included, although their trial experience need not have been in medical malpractice cases.
Id. § 148-a(2). All parties must be protected by the presence of counsel at the hearings. A
failure to attend may result in the removal of the case from the calendar. Id. § 148-a(5). If a
satisfactory agreement is reached, a corresponding order is to be entered. If not, the judge
may schedule another hearing, or, if no solution is available, the case is to be put back on the
calendar in its regular place. Id. § 148-a(7).
3 38 Id. § 148-a(2)(d). The objection is to be decided by the presiding justice who is a
member of the panel. Id.
339 Id. § 148-a(8). This amendment creates an exception to the former prohibition
against the admission at trial of any statement or expression of opinion made during the
hearing. Compare id. with ch. 146, § 1(5), [1974] N.Y. Laws 843.
340 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 148-a(8) (McKinney Supp. 1975). If the statements are made
available to the jury, the doctor or attorney members of the panel may be called as witnesses,
but "with reference to the recommendation of the panel only." Id.
34 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 230(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).342 1d.
141 Id. The board must have at least 18 physician members, and the doctors are required
to have been licensed for at least 5 years by the State. Not less than seven laymen must also
be included on the board. The board's disposition is privileged from a subsequent action
provided it is without malice and there was reasonable belief that it was warranted "based
upon the facts disclosed." Id. § 230(8). To protect members at these proceedings, no right to
disclosure of what transpired is available. This prohibition does not apply, however, to
"statements made by any person in attendance at such a meeting who is a party to an action
or proceeding the subject matter of which was reviewed at such meeting." Id. § 230(9).
The proceeding begins with a preliminary investigation either on the board's initiative
1976]
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penalize doctors found guilty of professional misconduct 344 by the
state board. Hopefully, the institution of an effective disciplinary
procedure will decrease the incidence of medical malpractice.
The new act, while supposedly balancing the interests of all
involved - the doctors, the insurance companies, and the general
public3 45 - does not appear to accomplish this end. It certainly has
not succeeded in placating the medical profession. 346 The physi-
cians object to being judged by nondoctors347 and according to the
standards existing at the time of the case rather than those at the
time of the treatment. To avoid possible future malpractice
charges, some physicians are practicing "defensive medicine" and
prescribing unnecessary additional tests. 348 In most cases, the addi-
tional costs for these tests are borne by the patient.
or pursuant to a complaint. Id. § 230(10)(a). If a hearing is warranted, charges will be lodged
that state the facts material to the charges but not the evidence which will be presented to
prove them. Id. § 230(10)(b). A hearing will be held not more than 35 days after the charges
are filed. Id. § 230(10)(c). To protect the doctor, the hearing will be conducted by a board
other than the one that filed the charges. Id. § 230(10)(e). If the second board sustains the
charges at the hearing, the commissioner will receive a copy and may make a recommenda-
tion to the Board of Regents, which has the final decision as to the doctor's professional
misconduct. Id. §§ 2 3 0 (10 )(g), (h), (i). For a definition of professional misconduct see note
344 infra.
... Professional misconduct includes such practices as: (1) fraudulently obtaining a
license; (2) practicing the profession with gross negligence on one occasion or "negligence or
incompetence on more than one occasion"; (3) practicing while ability is impaired by alcohol,
drugs, or a physical or mental disability; (4) being habitually drunk or a drug user; (5) being
convicted of a crime under state or federal law; (6) refusing service on prejudicial grounds;
(7) aiding in the unauthorized practice of medicine; (8) practicing with a suspended license
or failing to notify the department of change of name or address; (9) committing unprofes-
sional conduct. N.Y. EDuc. LAW. § 6509 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
A new section was added to the Education Law which governs the Board of Regents'
handling of proceedings involving medical malpractice. Id. § 6510-a. Section 6511 provides
for such penalties as "censure and reprimand," suspension, revocation or annulment of the
license, and limitation on any later registration or license. Under the new amendment, the
suspension can be complete for a fixed period or either partial or complete pending
successful completion of a retraining course. Id. § 6511.
34 See Governor's Memorandum, May 21, 1975, as appearing in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1739
(McKinney), on approving ch. 109, §§ 1-37, [1975] N.Y. Laws 134 (McKinney).
346 See N.Y. Times, May 29, 1975, at 22, cols. 7-8; note 290 and accompanying text
supra.
... N.Y. Times, June 1, 1975, § I (News), at 46, col. 5, quoting Stephen H. Mackauf, Esq.,
member of the Committee on Medicine and Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York:
"The doctors have an ego problem when it comes to lawsuits which are critical of
them," he said. "While the doctors can be very critical of themselves in their own
conferences, when a layman says they've done something wrong they can't cope
with it."
That such lawsuits are either embarrassing or expensive to the doctors should not lead to
their immunity therefrom, however, since such a privileged status is "enjoyed by no other
persons and ... runs counter to the entire development of tort law in the present century."
Special Advisory Panel on Medical Malpractice, Memorandum of Position of N.Y.St. Ass'n Comm.
on Tort Reparations, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26, 27 (1976).
"' N.Y. Times, July 27, 1975, at 30, col. 1; id., June 5, 1975, at 28, col. 5; id., June 1,
1975, § 1 (News), at 46, col. 4.
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Another objection of the medical profession is to the con-
tingency fee system. Doctors contend that it influences lawyers to
push for higher jury awards. 349 Yet, of the 2000 malpractice claims
finalized in 1974, no awards were made in 70 percent of the
cases.350 Assuming most claims are taken on a contingency fee
basis, this would seem to indicate that most lawyers were paid
nothing for their services.
Dealing with the medical malpractice crisis was -obviously a
trying task for the legislature. The problems of medical malpractice
insurance are manifold since they touch upon "issues of vital con-
cern to the medical and legal professions, the insurance industry
and consumers."'351 When threats were made to end malpractice
insurance unless rates were precipitously raised, the legislature
quickly responded out of concern for the continued availability of
malpractice insurance in New York. Nevertheless, close analysis of
the legislation suggests that the legislature may have acted too
hastily. 15 2 Perhaps, rather than submitting to claims that malprac-
tice insurance was unprofitable and the rates must be increased, the
legislature should have investigated the claims more fully before
changing the law. 353 In any event, the real party who must ulti-
mately bear the weight of increased premiums is the public. 35 4
345 Id., June 6, 1975, at 18, col. 2. On the other hand, it has been argped that since
lawyers discourage the bringing of claims which are not both substantial and meritorious,
they, together with the legal system in general, "actually insulate the medical profession from
a large percentage of the potential claims against it." Special Advisory Panel on Medical
Malpractice, Memorandum of Position of N.Y. St. Ass'n Comm. on Tort Reparations, 48 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 26, 27 (1976).
3s0 N.Y. Times, June 1, 1975, § 1 (News), at 46, col. 4.
3' Governor's Memorandum, May 21, 1975, as appearing in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1739,
1740 (McKinney), on approving ch. 109, §§ 1-37, [1975] N.Y. Laws 134 (McKinney).
352 Dean McLaughlin has commented:
The primary purpose of the new malpractice bill is to minimize claim loss experi-
ence so that medical malpractice insurance premiums will be kept within acceptable
reach. To accomplish this objective many rational considerations fell by the wayside
as a politically expedient solution acceptable to everyone caught up in the malprac-
tice maelstrom evolved.
7B McKNNEY'S CPLR 214-a, commentary at 48 (Supp. 1975). He h;s described the final
form of the legislation as "a melange of substantive and procedural prpviions that are not
entirely coherent." Id. 208, commentary at 26.
3 Unfortunatey, the State Insurance Department has never fully assessed whether the
private companies have profited from the writing of medical malpractice insurance. N.Y.
Times, June 1, 1975, § I (News), at 46, col. 6. Apparently, part of the problem has been the
lack of information on these private companies. Id., May 29, 1975, at 22, col. 5. It would
appear that the legislature has decided to attack this problem after precluding the claims of
many plaintiffs, rather than before. The new legislation requires insurance companies
issuing malpractice insurance policies to file detailed claim reports with the Superintendent
of Insurance and the Commissioner of Health as to "all claims for medical malpractice made
against any of its insureds and received by it during the ... six month period" prior to the
issuance of such insurance. N.Y. INs. LAw § 335(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
... N.Y. Times, July 27, 1975, at I, col. 4.
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Since the public is in effect the insurer, it is submitted that consid-
eration should be given to State assumption of this function. 55
3"" The solution of the problem is not no-fault insurance, according to one author.
Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 597-98 (1973). The
primary reason for this view is that medical malpractice actions raise difficult questions of
causation. Id. at 597. For a discussion of the complex causation problems that arise in the
area of medical malpractice, see D. LouIsELL & H. WILLIAMS, I MEDICAL MALPRAcrTCE
§ 8.07 (1973).
